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Abstract
Results from international standardized tests show large cross-country differences in stu-
dents’ performances. Where do these gaps come from? This paper argues that differences in
cultural environments and parental inputs may be of great importance. We show that the
school performance of second generation immigrants is closely related with the one of native
students in their parents’ countries of origin. This holds true even after accounting for differ-
ent family background characteristics, schools attended and selection into immigration. We
quantify the overall contribution of various parental inputs to the observed cross-country
differences in the PISA test performance, and show that they account for about 40% of
the gap between East Asia and other regions. This pattern questions whether PISA scores
should be interpreted only as a quality measure for a country’s educational system. They
actually contain an important intergenerational and cultural component.
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1 Introduction
According to international standardized tests, there are large and persistent cross country dif-
ferences in the performances of students of similar age. East Asian countries like Korea, Japan,
China and Singapore consistently position themselves at the top of international rankings,
while the relatively disappointing performance of several Southern European and Latin Amer-
ican countries has become a hot topic in the public debate. This is true, though to a slightly
different extent, across all subjects commonly tested in these international studies and across
all years for which these comparisons are available.
While these facts have been well known at least since the release of the first results of the
PISA test, they have recently received renewed attention in light of an emerging literature that
puts them at the center of the discussion on cross country differences in economic performance.
Kimko and Hanushek (2000), Hanushek and Woessmann (2012a) and Schoellman (2012), among
others, argue that average years of schooling, the standard proxy in the growth literature for
the quantity of human capital, does a rather poor job of measuring differences across countries
in terms of the knowledge embodied in their workers, while standardized tests allow to capture
differences in terms of human capital quality which turn out to have much greater explanatory
power for differences in GDP.
Given the increasing role these cross-country gaps in standardized tests play in the growth
literature, it becomes important to understand where they come from. Most of the public and
academic debate on this issue tend to rely on (and argue in favor of) an interpretation of PISA
scores as measures of school quality. The popular press is rich of anecdotes on the severity
and depth of school curricula in some Asian countries, which introduce students to challenges
often quite demanding for their age. On the other hand, there is some evidence (once again,
mostly anecdotal) of important differences in terms of parental inputs, a broad category which
includes parenting styles and parents’ attitudes and beliefs towards education. The international
bestseller by Chua (2011) coined the expression “Tiger Mother” to describe the rather strict
way in which some Asian parents raise up children, pushing on academic excellence and very
long studying hours.
In this paper we aim at shedding some light on the importance of parental inputs in PISA
test scores. Discriminating between the contribution of parental inputs and that of the schooling
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system has rather important implications, since it determines whether Western countries aiming
at improving their students’ performance should consider imitating some of the characteristics
of the East Asian school system, or whether the explanation for achievement gaps lies in deeper
cultural factors, perhaps harder to affect for policy makers. With this in mind, our objective
is to investigate how much of the cross country variation in test scores can be attributed to
differences in parental inputs, and what is the nature of these differences in parental inputs in
the first place.
It is important to clarify that our focus in this paper is on the cross-country variation in
average test scores only, as opposed to the variation across students within a given country.
We are therefore after a country-specific parental component, which captures a set of practices,
inputs, attitudes and beliefs that on average belong to parents of a given nationality. Of course
parents differ on a wide array of dimensions even within countries, and it is likely that some
of these differences will be important determinants of individual students’ performances in
standardized tests. However, for the study of cross country gaps in average scores, and cross
country differences in GDP growth, what matters are gaps in terms of average parental inputs
across countries.
Such analysis is obviously complicated by the fact that parental inputs are typically difficult
to measure, and, even when proxies are available, it is unclear how to separately identify their
effect from the quality of the school system. In this paper we wish to overcome these difficul-
ties by studying test scores for second generation immigrants. We identify the importance of
country-specific parental inputs by comparing the performance of students born and educated
in a given country and in the same school, but with parents of different nationalities. Since
factors such as the school curriculum, teaching style and school infrastructure (as well as other
individual level characteristics) are being kept fixed in this comparison, we argue that we can
reasonably attribute any residual difference to inputs received by their parents. In this respect,
our paper shares the spirit and the approach of several studies that look at first and second gen-
eration immigrants to identify the importance of “portable” cultural and familiar components
for various different outcomes (the so-called “epidemiological approach”; see among others Giu-
liano, 2007; Fernandez and Fogli, 2009; Alesina and Giuliano, 2010; Fernandez, 2011; Alesina
et al., 2013). We then show that the results from this simple empirical exercise can be used to
decompose the cross-country variation in test scores between different sources, shedding light
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on the nature of these gaps.
Our results point towards a substantial role for the parental component. We find the per-
formance in the PISA test of second generation immigrant students, living in the same country
and studying in the same school, is very closely related to the one of natives1 from the country
of origin of their parents. In particular, second generation immigrants from high PISA countries
score better than their peers from low PISA countries, even when they are observed in the same
school and even if their parents have the same level of education and other observable char-
acteristics. This pattern is present also when we focus on a different schooling outcome from
a different sample, such as the probability of grade repetition in the US Census; once again,
the best performing second generation immigrants are those whose parents come from coun-
tries where natives are particularly successful in standardized tests. As we discuss at length,
these results are unlikely to be driven by a pattern of differential selection of emigrating parents
from different countries, which, if anything, seems to go against finding our results. Taking our
estimates at face value, we find that at least 10% of the total cross-country variation in test
scores can be accounted for by differences in parental inputs. Their contribution is substantially
higher when we look at the gaps between specific countries: for example, at least 40% of the
out-performance of East Asian and Souther European countries is persistent across second gen-
eration immigrants, suggesting that parental practices play a predominant part in explaining
this gap.
We then move to explore more in detail the nature of these differences in terms of parental
inputs, making use of both the PISA and US Census data as well as of several other sources. We
first show that the relationship between the performance of a second generation immigrant and
the average score in the parents’ country of origin is weaker for parents that are more educated.
This suggests that what drives our results is not something related to the quantity or quality
of education received by parents in their home country. Moreover the relationship weakens
if parents have spent more years in the host country, suggesting the importance for school
performance of country-specific “cultural” traits, that are progressively lost by immigrants as
they integrate in their new host country. We also look at detailed time use surveys on immigrants
in the US, to investigate whether differences in parents and students’ observable practices can
1Throughout the paper, we call natives those students born in the country where they are taking the test
and whose parents are born in the same country as well. Students born in a country different from the one where
they are taking the test are excluded from all the analyses that follow.
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help to explain gaps in performance between children of different nationalities. Our results
suggest that this is a promising avenue for further exploration, since parents from high PISA
countries systematically spend more time on various forms of childcare, while their children
spend more time studying and in related activities.
Beside contributing directly to the previously mentioned debate on cross country differences
in human capital quality, our results speak to a wide literature across economics and sociology
that studies the school performance of first and second generation immigrant children (see
Levels et al., 2008; Dustmann et al., 2012, for broad reviews). Differently from these papers,
the objective of our analysis is to understand gaps in performance between natives of different
nationalities, and our focus on second generation immigrants is mostly instrumental in that it
provides us with an empirical strategy to discriminate between possible sources of these gaps.
As a consequence of this, our empirical approach is also different: we relate gaps between second
generation immigrant groups to gaps between natives in the corresponding countries of origin,
while most of this literature has focused on the comparison between immigrants and natives in
the host country2 (Schnepf, 2004; Marks, 2005; Song, 2011, among others). On top of this, by
combining several waves of the PISA test we can conduct our analysis on a broad sample of host
countries and countries of origin (while, for example, Dustmann et al. (2012) focus on Turkish
immigrants, and Jerrim (2015) on East Asian immigrants), and we rely on several additional
sources to provide suggestive evidence on the mechanism behind our results.
More broadly, our findings are also connected to a literature examining the intergenerational
transmission of skills as a function of parental ethnicity or nationality.3 In his seminal work,
Borjas (1992) uses data from the General Social Survey (GSS) and the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY) to argue that the average level of education in the ethnic environ-
ment of parents, what he calls “ethnic capital”, plays a role in the human capital accumulation
process of the following generations in the US. The emphasis on cross-country differences in
parental inputs is shared by Doepke and Zilibotti (2012), who develop a model of preference
2As a partial exception, Levels et al. (2008), Dronkers and de Heus (2012) and Dronkers and de Heus (2016)
do compare the performance of (a combination of) first and second generation immigrants across countries of
origin. However, they do not relate those to the performances of natives in the countries of origin, nor explore
the implications in terms of cross-country gaps in performance.
3Our focus on parental inputs is motivated by a growing literature highlighting the role in children’s ed-
ucational development of transmittable cultural values such as attitudes towards school, aspirations and non
cognitive skills (Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001; Brunello and Schlotter, 2011; Behncke, 2012; Borghans et al.,
2008; Carneiro et al., 2007).
5
transmission to explain the international variation in parenting styles as a function of local eco-
nomic conditions. Schoellman (2016) infers from the US labor market outcomes of Indochinese
refugees that country-specific environments can not account for a large cross-country variation
in early-childhood human capital, and suggests that differences in parental inputs might play a
bigger role.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 shows empirical
evidence on the performance of second generation immigrants as a function of their parents’
country of origin. Section 4 addresses the possibility that our findings are driven by different
forms of selection. Section 5 makes use of these results to quantify the overall importance of the
parental component for cross-country differences in test scores, while Section 6 explores more
in detail the possible mechanisms behind our results. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
Our main data come from the 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012 waves of the PISA test. PISA is a
triennial survey of the knowledge and skills of 15-year-old children, explicitly designed to allow
comparisons across countries. Since 2003, 73 countries have administered at least one wave of
the test, covering all OECD members as well as some partner countries. Typically, each country
selects between 4,500 and 10,000 students through a two-stage stratified sampling technique,
where a random sample of at least 150 schools enrolling 15-year-old students is drawn first, and
then 35 students within each school are randomly selected to take part to the test. Throughout
the analysis, we make use of the sample weights provided by the OECD.
The PISA test covers three subjects: reading comprehension, science and mathematics.
Neither students nor teachers know the result of the test at the end, so these are rather low
stake exams for students. Since each student is tested on a random subset of questions, for
comparability reasons test results are not presented as point estimates but rather as “plausible
values”. The OECD estimates for each student a probability distribution of test scores based
on their answers, and randomly draws from it five “plausible values” (see OECD (2011) for
details).4 PISA scores are standardized to have mean 500 and standard deviation 100 across
4Throughout the analysis on the PISA data, we compute our statistics of interest and their the standard errors
by using the unbiased shortcut procedure described in OECD (2009) and followed by the literature (Dustmann
et al., 2012), which takes into account both the use of plausible values for students’ test scores and the two-stage
stratified sampling design underlying the PISA test.
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the (pooled, equally weighted) OECD countries participating in the wave where the subject-
specific scale was set5. We further standardize them to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1
for each subject, on the same scale.
As well known, results for all subjects vary greatly across countries. In an attempt to
summarize this variation, Table 1 shows the average score of native6 students within a number
of broadly defined geographical regions7. The superior performance of East Asian countries is
particularly strong in mathematics, but the ranking across regions is quite stable across different
subjects. The magnitude of the gaps is quite striking. According to OECD (2012a), a gap of 0.4
in this scale corresponds roughly to what is learned in an average year of schooling. It follows
that East Asian students have a more advanced knowledge of mathematics which corresponds
to approximately 1.5 additional years of schooling compared to Southern Europe, and to 4
additional years of schooling compared to Latin America and Other Asian countries. Region-
wide averages mask a even larger heterogeneity across individual countries: in particular, China8
reports an average mathematics score of 1.08 standard deviations larger than the average.9
The PISA data include a Student Questionnaire in every wave, which provides basic de-
mographic information on students and parents, including their country of origin. The exact
country of origin of the parents is, however, not available in all participating countries question-
naires and for the wave 2000.10 On top of this, for some countries and waves further information
is available from the School Questionnaire and the Parent Questionnaire. In particular, we use
the School Questionnaire to construct some measures of school quality, and the Parent Ques-
5The subject-specific scale was established in the first wave where each subject was the major domain of the
test, that is 2000 for reading, 2003 for mathematics and 2006 for science. The reported statistics for the science
test refer only to the 2006, 2009 and 2012 waves, which are fully comparable between each other.
6Throughout the paper we use the term natives to refer to the group of children born and educated in a
certain country, whose mother/parents were born in the same country. On average, across countries participating
to the PISA test, 78% of the target population can be classified as native, according to this definition.
7See Appendix A for a list of countries belonging to each region. The grouping is not strictly geographi-
cal, since Singapore belongs to East Asia while Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam do not. East Asia includes
those countries in the region whose exceptional performance has become a natural benchmark for international
comparisons.
8The PISA test in China is held in Shanghai only, and as such is not representative of the whole country.
On the other hand, in our sample second generation immigrants from China might come from any part of the
country, since we do not have information on the region of origin. This mismatch is likely to work against our
main finding, since Shanghai is one the wealthiest are of China and Chinese second generation immigrants in our
sample will be negatively selected. See section 4 for a discussion on this issue.
9Table 12 lists the mathematics score for all countries with at least 100 second generation immigrants in our
sample.
10Individual countries moreover have some flexibility on how to classify parents’ country of origin. While
most have indicators for each country, some group small countries in broader categories. We construct a set of
countries/regions consistently defined over time. See Appendix A for the details.
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tionnaire to get additional information on parents’ age and education.
The final sample includes 43,494 second generation immigrants on the mother side and
43,740 on the father side, from 49 and 48 different countries of origin and distributed across 39
host countries. Table 3 displays the number and main destination countries of second generation
immigrants from each country of origin that can be included in our decomposition exercise, while
Table 4 provides a similar breakdown across host countries. Sample sizes vary greatly, and for
some countries of origin we have only a few parents to work with. To account for this, we
weight countries of origin by the number of second generation immigrants in the sample when
considering cross-country patterns, and we present country-specific estimates only for those
countries of origin where the number of observations is sufficiently high. Descriptive statistics
for second generation immigrants on the mother side are provided in Table 2.11
The second source of data is the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) created
by the US Census Bureau. The IPUMS consists of individual and household level data from
the decennial census in the US and includes nearly all the details originally recorded by the
census enumerations. We use the 1% samples from the 1970 and 5% sample from the 1980
censuses. Even if IPUMS has little information on children’s outcomes, it does, however, contain
information on each individual’s exact grade attending at school.12 We follow Oreopoulos and
Page (2006) in combining this information with children’s age to construct an indicator of
whether or not each student has repeated any grade. As pointed out by Oreopoulos and Page
(2006), grade repetition is a widespread phenomenon in the United States and is correlated
with many commonly used measures of educational achievement and socioeconomic success.
We classify a child as a repeater if his or her educational attainment is below the mode for
the corresponding state, age, quarter of birth, and census year cell. Following Oreopoulos and
Page (2006), we focus on children between the ages of 8 and 15, since children younger than 8
have not had many opportunities to repeat a grade, and children older than age 15 might have
left home already or dropped out of school. To adjust for the fact that older sample members
have had more opportunities to repeat a grade, and to adjust for possible gender differences
in grade repetition, all regressions include controls for age dummies and gender. Moreover, we
experimented with several alternative definitions of grade repetition and our results are robust
11Corresponding descriptive statistics on PISA data for the samples of second generation immigrants on the
father side and natives can be found in Appendix B and C.
12This information is only available until 1980, which prevents us from using more recent years.
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throughout. The final sample includes 53,081 second generation immigrants on the mother side
and 46410 on the father side, from 61 different countries of origin. Descriptive statistics for
second generation immigrants on the mother side are provided in Table 6.13
For Section 6.2, we use the ATUS-US Time Use Survey to analyze how immigrant parents
and their children spend their time. We pool together all waves between 2002 and 2013. The
ATUS survey was administered only to one person per household, chosen randomly among all
individuals at least 15 years old. We use both data on parents and children, where children are
those individuals between 15 and 18 years old. For parents, we construct a variable measuring
the total time (in minutes) spent on child care on the previous day, and three subcategories that
split total child care in educational, recreational and basic activities.14 Descriptive statistics on
parents’ and students’ time allocation are displayed in Tables 16 and 18.
Finally, we rely on several other sources to construct our controls at the level of parents’
country of origin. We take GDP per capita in 2006 from the PWT, average years of schooling
for different demographic groups from Barro and Lee (2013), measures of school quality from
Bartik (2008), various answers from the World Value Survey to proxy for cultural differences
and data on the religion composition in 1970 from Barro and McCleary (2003). For details on
the construction of these variables see Appendix A.
3 Reduced Form Evidence
In this section we examine whether the school performance of second generation immigrants is
related to the one of natives in their parents’ country of origin. Throughout the section, we
focus our analysis on second generation immigrants on the mother side only. This is done only
to simplify the exposition, and alternative specifications in Appendices B and C show that our
results hold without exception when we look at second generation immigrants on the father side
or at the whole sample of second generation immigrants and natives.15 We present results for
the PISA and the US Census samples in turn.
13Corresponding descriptive statistics on US Census data for the samples of second generation immigrants on
the father side and natives can be found in Appendix B and C.
14We follow Aguiar and Hurst (2007) for the construction of these variables. See Appendix A for the details.
15This more complete specification will be used for our decomposition in Section 5
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3.1 PISA
Let Tmicst denote the PISA math
16 score in year t of child i, studying (and born) in country c and
in school s, whose mother was born in country m.17 We start from the following specification:
Tmicst “ θ0 ` θ1Tm ` θ2Xmicst ` θ3Zm ` θcs ` θt ` εmicst (1)
where Tm is the average score of native students in the mother’s country of origin18,19, Xmicst
is a vector of individual characteristics of student and parents, Zm are controls at the mother
country of birth level, θsc is a country or school (depending on the specification) fixed effect
20,
θt is a PISA wave fixed effect and ε
m
icst is an error term. The main coefficient of interest is θ1,
which captures the relationship between a given second generation immigrant’s performance
and the average score of native students in country m.
Here, Tm is used as a proxy for the bundle of characteristics of parents born in country
m which affect the school performance of their children. The average test score in a given
country reflects a combination of school quality, economic, cultural and institutional factors.
However, by analyzing children educated in the same country/school, who differ just because
their parents come from different countries, we disentangle the part of their tests scores related
to the institutional environment from the part related to parental inputs. The main worry
is of course that omitted inputs for students’ performance might be correlated with Tm, i.e.
that, for example, second generation immigrants whose parents come from high PISA countries
might receive higher investments in their educational development for reasons unrelated to their
parents’ nationality. The school fixed effect takes care of the possibility that they might attend
schools of higher quality, given that we are comparing students within the same school. On
top of this, we also control for parental characteristics which might be correlated with human
16The results are similar for the reading and science tests (see Appendix D). The Math test is often preferred
for international comparisons for the relative easiness of defining and quantifying a common set of expected skills
(Hanushek and Woessmann, 2012a).
17Throughout the paper, subscripts refer to the location and characteristics of students, while superscripts
refer to the country of origin of parents.
18The average score is computed across all available waves, applying the provided sample weights.
19In this setting the dominant information is found in cross-country variation. A panel data approach would
be of difficult implementation because the main regressor is indeed persistent over time (see Kimko and Hanushek
(2000)), and short run shocks and variations in PISA scores are likely to be caused by cohort effects rather than
significant changes in the cultural and educational environment. Moreover, PISA tests are available for few points
in time and for recent years only.
20Since the PISA test in not administered in the same schools across different waves, the school fixed effects
are effectively wave-specific.
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capital investments on children and with PISA scores, such as parental education21. In this
way, we are also able to understand how much of the gap comes from differences in parents’
observable characteristics and how much from differences in an unobservable, country-specific,
component. The possibility that our results are driven by differential selection on unobservables
of second generation immigrants will be discussed in great detail in Section 4.
Table 5 shows our main results. The sample is limited to second generation immigrants
on the mother side, and a dummy is included in all specifications to control for whether the
father is also foreign born.22 We proceed by progressively adding controls. Column 1 of Table
5 displays the raw correlation between PISA scores of second generation immigrant students
whose mother comes from country m and the average PISA score of natives in country m. It
is strong and highly significant: if we compare two second generation immigrant students, with
the mother of the first coming from a country where students score a standard deviation higher
than the mother of the second, we see the former doing better than the latter by 69% of a
standard deviation.23 The coefficient shrinks when we restrict the comparison to students that
are observed in the same country (Column 2) and, especially, in the same school (Column 3),
but is still positive and significant. The difference in the size of the coefficient between the first
two specifications and Column 3 is quite illuminating, since it suggests that mothers from high
PISA countries send their children to better schools. We will show further evidence of this and
discuss some implications for our empirical exercise in Section 4.
The specification in Column 4 adds controls for parental education, with the coefficient of
interest being hardly affected. This finding is useful for the interpretation of the mechanisms
behind our results: it suggests that the estimate of θ1 is unlikely to be driven by some parents’
unobservable skills (like ability), since we would expect these unobservables to be correlated
to parental education, and therefore the inclusion of this last variable to matter a lot for our
coefficient of interest. What drives our result seems to be something not correlated with parents’
education level24. Finally, the last two columns of Table 5 show that results are not driven by
21Additional results with socioeconomic status as controls are not show here, and are available upon request.
Information on parental age is available only for country and waves for which the Parent Questionnaire was
administered. Our results are robust to the inclusion of these controls in this sub-sample.
22This specification therefore ignores the variation in parental inputs associated with the country of origin of
the father. As mentioned earlier, specifications that focus on fathers or that include the whole sample of second
generation immigrants and natives give very similar results, and are shown Appendix B and C respectively.
23Here we refer at the standard deviation of the individual level scores, not of the country average scores.
24A possible concern, though, is that θ1 is not much affected because parental education for immigrant
parents is measured with error. Indeed, the estimated coefficients for these variables are quite small and, with
11
the particularly good performances of East Asian students, since the coefficient is robust to the
inclusion of continent fixed effects and to the exclusion of East Asian mothers.
Figure 1 summarizes the results presented in this section. The left panel displays, for all
countries with at least 100 second generation immigrants on the mother side in the sample,
the strong and positive relationship between the average score of second generation immigrants
and the average score of natives in the mother’s country of origin country. The right panel
shows that the correlation weakens but is still positive and significant when we clean the scores
of second generation immigrants from the effect of observable characteristics, including school
fixed effects.
3.2 US Census
We apply a similar specification as in equation (1) on the US Census data, using a dummy
equal to one if a child has never repeated any grade as our dependent variable. We notice that
this outcome, while still related to school performance, captures quite a different dimension
compared to the PISA score, given that the variation in this case comes only from the bottom
part of the distribution (more than 80% of the students in the sample has never repeated a
grade, as shown in Table 6). On the other hand, while the PISA dataset contains only 15 year
old children, the US data allows us to look at students between 8 and 15 years old. We therefore
find quite noteworthy that our results generalize to this sample as well.
The US Census does not contain any information on the particular school children are
attending, making it impossible to compare second generation immigrants in the same school,
as we did for Table 5. In an attempt to capture some of the differences across educational
systems within the US, we control for State and Commuting Zone25 fixed effect. However, the
US Census provides us with precious information on parents’ immigration history, so that we
can control for the number of years passed since the mother has first migrated to the US. On
the exception of the tertiary education dummy for fathers, not statistically significant. Moreover, the presence of
some measurement error is quite realistic, given that PISA questionnaire are filled in by students, who may have
difficulties reporting their parents’ educational level, especially if parents were educated in a different country.
To address this possibility, we exploit the fact that for countries and waves where the Parents Questionnaire was
administered, parents were asked to report their education as well. We therefore instrument the mother’s and
father’s educational levels, as reported by children, with those reported by the parents themselves. Since the
sample that allows this exercise is considerably smaller, we focus on the specification that includes both natives
and second generation immigrants on either parent’s side.The results (available in Appendix E) show that, while
there is some degree of measurement error, the coefficient of interest θ1 does not vary much in magnitude between
the OLS and the IV specifications.
25Commuting Zones are constructed following Autor and Dorn (2013).
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top of this, we can also control for a richer (compared to the PISA sample) set of observable
characteristics on family background, such as family size, child’s and parents’ age and family
income.
Table 7 shows our main results. Once again the coefficient on Tm is positive and significant,
and does not change much in magnitude when controls for parental education and years since
migration are included. According to column 4, the most complete specification, an increase of a
standard deviation in the PISA score of students in the mother’s country of origin is associated
with a higher probability of not having repeated any grade by 2.5 percentage points (3% over
the average). This effect is not trivial, given that, as mentioned earlier, most students do not
repeat any grade. As for the PISA specification, the result is robust to the inclusion of continent
fixed effects and the exclusion of East Asian parents.
4 Selection
As our analysis relies on emigrant parents to make inference on all parents of a given nation-
ality, an obvious concern is represented by the fact emigrants are not a random sample of the
population, and might be selected on unobservable characteristics that also matter for children’s
school performance.
What type of selection should we worry about in this context? Figure 2 displays various
possibilities. In these plots the solid line represents the actual relationship between the score of
second generation immigrants and the one of natives from the parents’ country of origin, i.e. the
relationship that we would be able to observe in a world where emigrant parents were randomly
selected from the population. The dashed line represents instead what we would observe in our
data, assuming different pattern of selection into emigration. The first panel depicts the case
where the type of selection into emigration (as measured by the gap between the two lines) is the
same across countries of origin with different PISA scores: if this is the case, only the estimate
of the intercept of our regression will be biased and out estimates of θ1 will therefore not be
affected. In the second panel we have the case where parents emigrated from countries with
high PISA scores are more positively selected than parents emigrated from countries with low
PISA scores, while in the third panel we have the opposite case. These patterns of differential
selection would lead to a biased estimate of our coefficient of interest, and in particular the case
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depicted in the second panel could rationalize the findings of the previous sections.
While the main threat to our approach is represented by differential selection on unobserv-
ables, it is useful to verify whether emigrant parents are differentially selected on observable
characteristics. The idea here is that unobservables that positively affect children’s school per-
formance (like parents’ ability, motivation etc) are likely to be positively correlated with some
observable characteristics, like parents’ education and socioeconomic status. We can therefore
somehow alleviate the concerns on differential selection by showing that the relative “quality”
of emigrants compared to stayers is not higher for high PISA countries.
For each emigrant parent we construct a measure of selection given by the ratio between
his or her years of schooling and the average years of schooling of non emigrant parents’ from
the same country.26 Figure 3 plots the average of this measure of selection across mothers’
countries of origin against the average score of native students in those countries. If anything,
the relationship seems to be negative, suggesting that emigrants from high PISA countries are
more adversely selected (at least in terms of observable characteristics) than emigrants from
low PISA countries (panel 3 of Figure 2).
In addition, Table 8 shows results of a regression of our measure of selection of emigrant
parents on the average PISA score in their country of origin, controlling for country (columns
1 and 3) and school (columns 2 and 4) fixed effects. The pattern is rather similar for mothers
and fathers: we find some evidence of negative selection within host countries, and stronger
evidence within schools.27
A distinct issue, though obviously related, is selection into host countries and schools, con-
ditional on emigration. This is important for the interpretation of θ1. As mentioned earlier,
the introduction of host country and, in particular, school fixed effect lowers our correlation of
interest in Table 5, suggesting that parents from high PISA countries might select educational
environments more conducive to a good schooling performance. In order to provide direct
evidence for this, we use the proxies for school quality we constructed from the information
26We construct a mapping between the ISCED classification of educational levels and equivalent years of
schooling by using the country specific conversion table in OECD (2012b).
27This pattern of negative differential selection within schools is consistent with the view that there is assor-
tative matching between the quality of parental inputs and the quality of the school attended by children. The
logic is as follows: when we observe two students in the same school, with one of them having received higher
quality parental inputs (which in our setting means having parents born in high PISA country), then it must be
that the other student, or his parents, are “better” on some other (unobservable) characteristics, otherwise the
two students would not be in the same school to start with.
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available in the School Questionnaire. Table 9 shows that, after controlling for country fixed
effects and the usual observable characteristics, a higher PISA score in the country of origin of
the mother is associated with schools where natives score better in the PISA test, no matter
whether we take the raw average (column 1) or we clean it from observable characteristics (col-
umn 2), where admissions are more likely to be based on academic records, the proportion of
teachers with at least some tertiary education is higher and the proportion of students dropping
out is lower.28
This result has important implications when decomposing the importance of differences in
parental and school inputs across countries. On the one hand, school selection is a choice in
which parents (either directly or indirectly, through the transmission of attitudes and values)
play an important role, so that, when comparing second generation immigrants, the attendance
of better schools could be viewed as one of the channels through which superior parental inputs
manifest themselves. On the other hand, for the purpose of explaining differences in the average
performance of natives across countries, the extent to which differences in the in average ability
or willingness to select better schools can matter is limited by the available supply of school
quality in each country. At one extreme, if all schooling resources that matter are utilized to
full capacity, then endowing a country with a higher average parental effectiveness in school
selection would not contribute at all in boosting the average score29. This scenario is probably
too stark however, since in several countries students might be able to access better schools
without necessarily displacing others, or parents’ drive for school quality could stimulate its
supply to start with.30
In our context, specifications with school fixed effects wash out differences in school quality
from our correlation of interest, while specifications which only include host country fixed effects
“attribute” all of the within-country variation in school quality documented above to parents.
In light of the difficulty of establishing the relative merit of these two views, for both our reduced
form evidence and decomposition exercise we show results from both specifications, with the
28Tables 7 in Appendix B and 17 in Appendix C show that the same results hold when we look at fathers or
at the whole sample.
29This would not necessarily be true in a world where parental and schooling inputs are complementary in the
human capital production function, since then the matching pattern between schools or families would matter
for the average performance. In Appendix F we investigate this possibility, and conclude that it is unlikely to be
quantitatively important in our setting.
30See McMillan (2000) and references therein for a discussion on the role of parental pressure in holding schools
accountable and improving their effectiveness.
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understanding that regressions with school fixed effects provide us with a lower bound on the
importance of parental inputs, while the ones with country fixed effects are likely to overstate
their importance.31
While the discussion so far has focused on the “absolute” quality of schools to which second
generation immigrants are allocated, an additional concern is that immigrant parents from high
PISA countries may be systematically selecting host countries (or schools) where, because of
idiosyncratic factors, it is easier for them and their children to integrate and perform well. Of
course the quality of the match between parents or children on one side and countries or schools
on the other is unobservable, and it is difficult to rule out entirely this possibility. However,
we can check whether immigrant from high PISA countries are located in countries which are,
according to reasonable proxies, culturally closer to their country of origin. To explore this
possibility, Table 10 explicitly looks at the linguistic dimension. In column 2 we add to the
baseline regression of column 1 a dummy variable that takes value of 1 for all students that
declare to speak a foreign language at home (which is available only for part of the sample).
While the coefficient on this newly added control is, as expected, negative and significant, our
main coefficient of interest is virtually unaffected. In column 3 we add controls for whether
the mother tongues of mothers and fathers (inferred from their countries of origin) are the
same of the mother tongue spoken in the host country, while in column 4 we add a measure
of linguistic distance from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2015). In both cases the coefficient on Tm
remains positive and significant, and does not change much in size.32
5 Decomposing schools and parents contributions
For our decomposition we introduce a slightly more general model, which allows parental inputs
supplied by both mothers and fathers to differ across countries. Suppose that the test score in
wave t of a second generation immigrant i, studying in school s and country c, whose mother
and father were born in countries m and f , is given by
Tmfisct “ Parentsmfisct ` αsc ` αt ` ρ1Xmfisct ` εmfisct (2)
31The patterns of negative differential selection documented in Table 8 reinforce our interpretation of the
school fixed effect specification as lower bound.
32See Appendix B for the corresponding results for second generation immigrants on the father side.
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where Parentsmfisct is the combined effect of all parental inputs,
Parentsmfisct “ γm ` δf ` β1ParentsEdumfisct ` ηmfisct (3)
with γm and δf being country-specific components capturing a set of average (unobservable)
characteristics of mothers and fathers from countries m and f respectively. The parental compo-
nent of student i includes also the effect of parents’ education, which potentially might influence
his or her performance in school. Combining (2) and (3) we obtain
Tmfisct “ β1ParentsEdumfisct ` γm ` δf ` αsc ` αt ` ρ1Xmfisct ` umfisct
This model can be estimated on the sample of students for which both parents are born
in a different country from the one where the PISA test is taking place. However, in order to
use all the available information in the data and to obtain more precise estimates for the other
controls (including the host country and school fixed effects), we include all second generation
immigrants and native students in the following specification
Tmfisct “ β1ParentsEdumfisct ` γm ` δf ` θmNatMothmfisct ` ζfNatFathmfisct ` ρ1Xmfisct ` αsc ` αt ` umfisct
(4)
where NatMothmfist and NatFath
mf
ist are dummies identifying native parents (mothers and
fathers, respectively). The coefficient θm (and similarly ζf ), in the spirit of a difference in
differences, captures the extent to which the relative performance of students whose mother
is from country m, compared to second generation immigrant students from another country,
is larger or smaller in country m (where the mother is native) as opposed to a different host
country. Importantly, we allow the “native advantage” to be country-specific for both mothers
and fathers: a failure to do so would imply that this kind of variation would be absorbed by the
country of origin fixed effects, which, in that case, would not be identified only out of second
generation immigrants (see footnote 34 for further discussion on this point).
The object whose variation we are ultimately interested in decomposing is the average score
(across all available waves) of native students in country c, which is given by
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T c “ α` Parentsc ` θc ` ζc ` αc ` ρ1Xc (5)
where Parentsc “ γc ` δc ` β1ParentsEduc, αc is either a weighted average of the school
fixed effects or the fixed effect for host country c (depending on the specification) and Xc and
ParentsEdu
c
are within country c averages.33 Equation (5) makes our decomposition explicit:
our objective is to evaluate the importance of Parentsc to account for the variation of T cc across
countries.34
In order to do that, we estimate our country c specific parental component from
{Parentsc “ pγc ` pδc ` pβ1ParentsEduc
where pγc, pδc and pβ are our estimated parameters from equation (4). As discussed earlier, we
focus on two different specifications, one that includes school fixed effects and another with only
host country fixed effects. Moreover, we display results for countries for which we have at least
100 second generation immigrants in our sample and therefore a reasonably precise estimate
of the corresponding fixed effect. Figure 4 plots the parental component obtained from both
specifications against the average score of natives (with ParentsCHINA being normalized to 1
in both cases)35. Not surprisingly, the estimated Parentsc is larger (in absolute terms) for
countries that perform better in the PISA test, which means that our parental component
does account for some of the cross-country variation (as opposed to masking an even larger
dispersion) of average test scores. Consistently with our discussion in Section 4, the dispersion
in Parentsc is larger under the country fixed effect specification, which allows the parental
component to absorb the within country variation in school quality.
As a simple summary statistic36, we compute the share of the total cross-country variance
33The constant α absorbs the average of the waves fixed effects.
34Notice that θc and ζc are not included in Parentsc. These components are identified out of the comparison
between native and second generation immigrant students in country c, and we think that various factors different
from parental inputs (such as the extent to which immigrants manage or are willing to integrate in their host
country, or even characteristics of the school curriculum) could drive the international variation in the “native
advantage”. Instead, we view our focus on second generation immigrants of different nationalities as one of the
main advantages of our empirical approach: as a way to allow us to clean our estimates from confounders that
would be difficult to proxy for. Nevertheless, even if we include θc and ζc in the parental component, they
are both positively correlated with T c, so including them in our parental component would lead us to infer a
(moderately) higher role for parental inputs.
35Table 12 displays Parentsc for all countries.
36Our decomposition exercise is conceptually similar to the ones proposed in Card et al. (2013) and Finkelstein
et al. (2014), who also use (in different contexts) fixed effects identified out of movers to separate the contribution
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of T cc accounted by Parents
c, simply as
VParents “ V arp
{Parentscq
V arpT cq
Moreover, for every country (or group of countries) c we can calculate the share of the gap in




T b ´ T c
Finally, to gauge the relative contribution of parental education and country-specific intercepts,
we also compute equivalent statistics for the country specific intercepts only,
VFE “ V arp
pγc ` pδcq
V arpT cq
SFEpc, bq “ ppγb ` pδbq ´ ppγc ` pδcq
T b ´ T c
Tables 11, 12 and 13 show the results of these calculations, both under the country fixed
effect and the school fixed effect specifications. For the pairwise comparisons, we focus on the
gap between China and the other countries for Table 12 and on the gap between East Asia and
the other regions as defined in Section 2 for Table 13.
Table 11 show that Parentsc accounts for at least 10% of the total variation across countries,
and up to 30% when we do not clean it from the variation in school quality within countries.
The results are similar when we restrict attention to the international variation in pγc ` pδc,
suggesting that cross-country differences in parents’ education do not play an important role.
However, the parental component plays a substantially larger role when accounting for the gap
between the top performers and other countries. Table 12 shows that, on average, between 19%
and 56% of China’s out-performance can be accounted by parental inputs. While some of the
country-specific estimates are too imprecise to allow definite conclusions, the gaps in Parentsc
are particularly high for several countries in the middle-bottom part of the score distribution
(Spain, Portugal, Italy, Croatia, Greece and Turkey in particular), but not so pronounced for
the worst performers.
of individual characteristics and geographical or institutional factors. Unfortunately, the lack of a panel dimension
on the student side prevents us from implementing an event-study type of analysis as they do.
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A similar message emerges from the analysis of broad regional groups in Table 13. Par-
ticularly striking are the results for Southern Europe and Middle East/North Africa, which as
shown in Table 1 display large gaps with respect to the best performing countries, more than a
third (and, under the host country fixed effect specification, virtually all) of which is potentially
explained by differences in terms of parental inputs. On the other hand, it is interesting to
notice the relatively smaller role that parental inputs play for Latin American countries, whose
poor performance in standardized test has been object of recent study (Hanushek and Woess-
mann, 2012b). Once again, the country of origin fixed effects and not the differences in the
parents’ educational level account for the bulk of the contribution of the parental component.37
6 Mechanism
In this section we attempt to open the black box of the parental inputs whose importance was
quantified above. What makes parents from high PISA countries more “effective” in terms of
the school performance of their children? While answering this question precisely is difficult, we
attempt to shed some light on this by proceeding in three steps. First, we distinguish between
two alternative interpretations on the source of differences in parental inputs, one based on
an intergenerational effect of parental education and another based on a cultural transmission
mechanism. Then we turn to the Time Use data to see whether immigrant parents from
high PISA countries and their children differ in some observable practices that might help us
to explain their better performance at school. Finally, we test whether measures relative to
countries’ of origin economic development, culture or religion can explain our correlation of
interest.
6.1 Interactions
The results shown in the previous sections can be rationalized by two conceptually distinct
interpretations. One possibility is that the outstanding performance of second generation im-
migrants from high PISA countries is a by-product of the fact that their parents received an
education of higher quality in their country of origin. While conceptually this would still imply
37For several geographic regions, and notably for the US, SFEpc, EAq is considerably larger than
SParentspc, EAq, since in those regions parents are on average more educated than their East Asian counter-
parts.
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that these students have an advantage in terms of parental inputs, the source of this advantage
would be the school system itself, creating a powerful intergenerational multiplier effect of edu-
cational quality. In other words, while our decomposition would still be valid in an accounting
sense, the underlying fundamental force driving this result would be the school system itself
and the policy implications would be different.
An alternative explanation is that there is some fixed cultural trait which parents transmit
to their children, which is unrelated to the quality of parental education and might have its
roots in factors deeply entrenched with a country’s history and culture. This would mean that
this component is likely to be quite persistent over time, and improving a country’s educational
system might not do much in raising the average test scores if this cultural aspect does not
change as well.
A useful way to discriminate between these two views is to explore the heterogeneity of the
importance of the country specific parental component with respect to parental education and
years since migration. If the intergenerational transmission of educational quality is important,
we would expect the correlation with the PISA score in the parents’ country of origin to be
particularly strong for immigrant parents with higher education in their home country38, which
have been more exposed to the educational system.39 At the extreme, parents with no education
could not transmit the quality of their home country’s educational system at all. On the other
hand, if the underlying mechanism is a fixed cultural trait we would expect that parents that
have been abroad for a longer time might be culturally more integrated in their host country
and would have at least in part converged to its cultural norms40. In that case, the correlation
with the average test score in the country of origin would be weaker for parents that have
emigrated many years ago. Moreover, there is some evidence that highly educated immigrants
have an easier time integrating in their host country41: if this is the case, under the “cultural”
38It is actually unclear whether only years of schooling in the home country should matter, giver that there
could be dynamic complementarities in the human capital accumulation process that make the impact of an
additional year of schooling in the host country stronger for parents that have spent the initial part of their
educational career in higher quality schools. Moreover, it is possible that parents emigrating from high PISA
countries would go to better schools once in the host country. Since we actually find a negative interaction term,
this issue is mostly inconsequential for our purposes.
39This line of reasoning is similar to the one in Schoellman (2012), even though here it is applied to returns
to parental education for school outcomes of their children.
40See Giavazzi et al. (2014) for evidence on the speed of convergence of different cultural traits.
41For example, there is widespread evidence that more educated migrants have a higher propensity to inter-
marry with natives (see Schoen and Wooldredge (1989); Sandefur and McKinnell (1986); Lichter and Qian (2001);
Meng and Gregory (2005); Chiswick and Houseworth (2011)), which is an important indicator of integration in
the host country.
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interpretation, parents’ years of schooling (acquired either in the home or in the host country),
would also alleviate the correlation between their children performance and the average score
in their country of origin.
To summarize, we have some testable implications to discriminate between the two mech-
anisms. The intergenerational transmission of educational quality mechanism would imply a
positive interaction term between parents’ years of schooling acquired in the home country and
the average score of natives in the same country. The fixed cultural trait mechanism would
instead predict a negative interaction between the average test score and parents’ years since
migration, as well as with parents’ years of schooling.
We now turn to the US Census data to put these predictions to empirical scrutiny. We once
again restrict attention to the results relative to second generation immigrants on the mother
side in the main text.42 We construct a measure of mothers’ years of schooling both in their
home and in their host countries based on the information on year of immigration and age at
the end of education (imputed from the educational level). Year of immigration is available only
as a categorical variable, identifying intervals of approximately 5 years. We therefore impute
the exact year of arrival in the US according to two alternative criteria: either we assign to
everybody the middle year of their interval (Table 14), or we impute the last year in that interval
in order to identify immigrants that most likely had their whole education in their home country
(Table 15)43.
Table 14 shows our main results. We start by adding to the baseline specification in column
1 an interaction term between Tm and mother’s years of schooling, finding a negative and
significant coefficient. When we break down years of schooling between those acquired in the
US and those acquired in country m (columns 3 and 4), we find that the interaction term is
negative in both cases, with coefficients of similar magnitudes. These results are inconsistent
with the presence of a strong intergenerational effect of educational quality.
A similar message emerges from the study of heterogeneity with respect to years since mi-
gration. According to the results in column 5, the correlation between Tm and the children’s
42The results for the rest of the sample are available in the Appendix.
43Regardless of the imputation strategy, for a few observations (approximately 2% of the sample) the mother
appears to have arrived in the US after her child was born. Since all children in the sample are (according to the
Census) born in the US, these might be cases where mothers have moved in and out the US and the recorded
date refers to the last time of arrival, or simply instances of coding errors. The results are robust to the exclusion
of these observations.
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school performance is weaker for mothers that have emigrated many years ago.44 This conver-
gence happens relatively quickly: based on column 5, for mothers with the average educational
profile45, the effect of Tm halves after 14 years spent in the US. Column 6 shows that this
pattern (as well as the results on education discussed above) is unaffected by the inclusion of
controls for age at migration, which has also been shown to be important for the assimilation
of immigrants (Bleakley and Chin, 2010; Nielsen and Schindler Rangvid, 2012).
A possible concern is that our imperfect mapping from the information available from the
Census and years of schooling accumulated in country m and in the US might confound our
results (see the discussion in footnote 38). To alleviate this concern, Table 15 shows results
for a sub-sample of mothers that we are more confident completed their whole education in
their country of origin, because we imputed their year of immigration using the most restrictive
criterion discussed above. We can see that again the interaction between Tm and mother’s
years of schooling is still negative and significant, as well as the one between Tm and years since
migration.
Overall, our results seem supportive of the fixed cultural trait interpretation, given that
our correlation of interest is attenuated by both parental education46 and integration in the
host country. To offer further visual evidence for the first fact, Figure 5 plots, for US Census
data, the country-specific (for all countries with at least 100 second generation immigrants in
the sample) intercept and coefficient on mother’s years of schooling from a regression of our
outcome of interest on these variables and the usual controls, with the sample always restricted
to second generation immigrants on the mother side. The correlation between students grades
and the average test scores in their mother’s country of origin is mainly driven by the intercept,
while the variation in returns to education, if anything, works in the opposite direction.47 This
pattern is different from the one documented by Schoellman (2012) for immigrants’ wages.
Schoellman (2012) shows that returns to education (and not the intercept) of US immigrants,
44This result provides an additional reason why our decomposition exercise in Section 5 might understate the
importance of parental inputs. If immigrant parents from different countries progressively become more similar
to each other as they integrate in their host country, we would find a larger role for parental components by
focusing on those who have just emigrated, which are still very comparable to non-emigrants in their country of
origin. Unfortunately, the lack of data in the PISA sample on date of immigration prevents us from allowing for
this type of heterogeneity.
45This corresponds to 8.15 years of education in the home country and 2.12 years of education in the US
46We verified that this pattern holds also for the PISA data. These results are not shown and are available
upon request.
47We built the same figure using the PISA data and the results are exactly the same.
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depending on their country of origin, are positively related to GDP per capita and PISA scores
in their home country and interprets this as evidence in favour of the fact that school quality
varies greatly across countries. Our results show that, while differences in school quality might
be important for labor market outcomes of immigrants, they do not seem to account for the
differential school performance of their children. What matters in this case seem to be fixed
cultural traits incorporated in the country specific intercepts.
6.2 Time Use
In this section we investigate whether the way in which immigrant parents from high PISA
countries and their children spend their time might help us interpreting our main results.
Table 17 starts by looking at parents. Columns 1 to 3 refer to total child care, while columns
4 to 6 break down the time spent with children in the educational, recreative and basic categories
described in Section 2. Across all specifications and time use categories, interviewed parents
from high PISA countries stand out for spending more time with their children. The result is
robust to the inclusion of state fixed effects and several controls on demographic characteristics
of both parents and children. Since time use variables are measured in minutes and refer to a
single day, from column 3 it emerges that an increase of one standard deviation in the PISA
score in a parent’s country of origin corresponds to a higher investment of approximately one
hour per week in total child care. This extra hour is quite evenly spread across the three time
use subcategories.
Table 19 examines instead time use habits of children. Here we restrict the sample to
students between 15 and 18 years old, which are enrolled in full time education; moreover, as
usual, we restrict attention to second generation immigrants on the mother side in the main
text. Our dependent variable is time spent studying, as a proxy for one the main inputs in
the educational process. While the sample size is quite small, we find a strong and significant
correlation with the average test score of the mother country of birth (Tm). According to column
3, the most complete specification, an increase of a standard deviation in Tm is associated with
3.6 extra hours of studying per week.
The results in this section seem to indicate that second generation immigrants do differ in
terms of observable practices as a function of the country of origin of their parents. In absence
of a credible estimate of the effectiveness of parental child care and children’s study time, it is
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of course difficult to establish where these differences might be driving the results found in the
previous sections.
6.3 Country Level Characteristics
We now present results from specification (1), augmented by a series of controls at the mother’s
country of origin level. The main objective of this analysis is to verify that the estimate of our
coefficient of interest does not pick up variation across different country-level characteristics,
that might also plausibly affect second generation immigrants’ school performance.
Table 20 includes controls related to the level of economic development and to the quality
of the education system in country m. In particular, we include log GDP per capita, the
percentage of native mothers with at least some tertiary education, average years of education
of natives between 20 and 30 years old in 1990 and the pupil to teacher ratio in primary schools
in country m. The introduction of these controls does not significantly affect the coefficient
on Tm.48 It is interesting to notice that GDP per capita in the country of origin appears to
be negatively correlated with the performance of second generation immigrants. As argued by
Levels et al. (2008), such a result might reflect the fact that immigrants from poorer countries
are more positively selected than immigrants from richer countries, a pattern that holds in our
data as well.49 Nevertheless, while of the expected sign, the change in the coefficient of Tm is
quite small, suggesting that this differential selection is unlikely to be quantitatively important.
Table 21 includes controls related to religion and cultural values. Columns 2 controls for
the religious composition of the population in 1970, while column 3 controls for some answers
to various World Value Survey questions that should capture attitudes towards education and
hard work.50 While some of the controls introduced seem to have explanatory power on the
performance of second generation immigrants, our coefficient of interest is virtually unaffected.
The parental component underlying our results does not seem to be easily measurable through
the cultural proxies commonly adopted in the literature.
48Regressions with other controls of school quality are available under request. The main result is unaffected
across all specifications we have experimented with.
49The selection analysis with respect to GDP is available upon request.
50We experimented with several additional questions, as well as with averaging across all relevant variables.
The results, available upon request, are similar to the ones displayed here.
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7 Conclusions
While PISA scores are often taken as a metric to compare the quality of different educational
systems, this is not the whole story. In this paper we argue that an important share of the
cross-country variation in test scores is driven by differences in broadly defined parental in-
puts. We arrive to this conclusion by comparing the PISA performance of second generation
immigrants, which are born and educated in the same country and school, but have parents of
different nationalities. While we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that some unobservable
characteristic plays a role in driving our results, we show through various checks that this is
unlikely to be the case, and that any residual pattern of differential selection would probably
go against finding our result.
We also provide evidence against the possibility that the superior performance of second
generation immigrants from high PISA countries is due to an intergenerational spillover of the
high quality education received by their parents. There seems to be some deep cultural factor
that makes parents born in some specific countries invest more in their children’s education.
Our paper leaves open important avenues for future research. While our main contribution
is to identify and quantify an important parental quality component in average PISA scores,
our evidence on the specific mechanisms behind this component is only suggestive. We believe
it would be important to deepen our understanding of what East Asian parents do differently
from Southern European ones (to pick a stark comparison) when raising their children, and
whether these differences are optimal responses to the economic environments they are placed
in, or maybe the byproduct of differences in preferences shaped by the historical experiences of
the two regions.
Moreover, our results could be viewed as a sign of caution for policymakers aiming to raise
their students’ performance in standardized tests. Since cross-country gaps seem to go beyond
differences in school quality, it is unclear to what extent various policies can be effective to
this end, given that the cultural factors that lead parents to invest more or less in children’s
education might be deeply entrenched and persistent over time.
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-1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5
Score Natives Country m
beta 0.186 st.error 0.026
Source: PISA (2003-2012). The left panel plots the average PISA score of second generation
immigrants whose mother is from country m (y-axis) with respect to the average PISA score of
natives in country m (x-axis), for all countries with at least 100 second generation immigrants on
the mother side in the sample. The right panel plots the estimated country of origin fixed effect from
a regression with individual math scores as dependent variable and gender, both parents’ education,
father’s immigration status and school fixed effects as additional controls, with the sample restricted
to second generation immigrants on the mother side. The fixed effect for China is normalized to 1.
The size of the circles is proportional to the number of second generation immigrants on the mother
side in the sample.
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Average Score Natives
beta -0.131 st.error 0.041
Source: PISA (2003-2012). The Figure plots a measure of the degree of selection into migration in
country m (the average years of schooling of emigrant parents over the average years of schooling of
remaining parents) (y-axis) with respect to the average PISA score of natives in country m (x-axis).
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Average Score Natives
School FE Country FE
Source: PISA (2003-2012). The Figure plots an estimate of the size of the parental component
(Parentsc in the decomposition described in Section 5, normalized such that it takes value 1 for
China) (y-axis) with respect to the average PISA score of natives in country m (x-axis). Only
countries with at least 100 second generation immigrants in the sample are included.
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Score Natives Country m
beta -0.005 st.error 0.002
Source: US Census. The two panels plot respectively the estimated country-specific intercepts and
coefficients on mother’s years of schooling from a regression of a dummy for not having repeated
any grade (as described in the text) on these variables and gender, child age dummies, parents’
age, family size, log family income, year fixed effect,state fixed effect, (year specific) quarter of birth
fixed effect, father’s years of schooling, father’s immigration status and commuting zone fixed effects
as additional controls, with the sample restricted to second generation immigrants on the mother
side. Only countries for which at least 100 second generation immigrants on the mother side are
included. The intercept for China is normalized to 1. The size of the circles is proportional to the
number of second generation immigrants on the mother side in the sample.
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Tables
Table 1: Average PISA Scores across Regions
Math Reading Science # Countries
East Asia 0.42 0.24 0.40 7
EU North 0.17 0.11 0.23 15
Oceania 0.14 0.16 0.26 2
North America -0.09 0.06 0.06 2
EU South -0.20 -0.17 -0.09 5
EU East -0.28 -0.43 -0.25 19
Middle East/NA -0.75 -0.54 -0.63 7
Other Asia -1.05 -0.93 -0.92 5
Latin America -1.10 -0.90 -0.95 11
The Table shows the average score for each region, across all available waves (for Science, only waves from
2006 onwards are considered). The averages are computed using the provided sample weights. Scores are
standardized to have mean 0 and (individual-level) standard deviation 1 across the (pooled, equally weighted)
OECD countries participating in the wave where the subject-specific scale was set.
Table 2: Summary statistics - PISA (Mothers)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Score -0.098 1.01 -3.54 3.09
Score Country m -0.07 0.60 -1.47 1.08
Mother Sec Edu 0.52 0.50 0 1
Mother Ter Edu 0.30 0.46 0 1
Father Sec Edu 0.51 0.50 0 1
Father Ter Edu 0.34 0.472 0 1
Immigrant Mother 1 0 1 1
Immigrant Father 0.65 0.48 0 1
Observations 43494
The Table shows descriptive statistics for second generation immigrants on the mother’s side. Sample includes
only cases where both parents report a country of origin and the country of origin of the mother runs a
PISA test on natives. Scores are from the math test and are standardized to have mean 0 and (individual-
level) standard deviation 1 across the (pooled, equally weighted) OECD countries participating in 2003.
Observations weighted accordind to the provided sample weights.
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Table 3: Second Generation Immigrants by Country of Origin - PISA Data
Mothers Fathers
Country # Host Top # Host Top
of Origin Number Countries Host Country Number Countries Host Country
Albania 360 5 Greece (200) 332 5 Greece (173)
Argentina 83 2 Uruguay (82) 80 1 Uruguay (80)
Australia 169 2 New Zealand (168) 133 2 New Zealand (132)
Austria 260 2 Switzerland (192) 188 2 Switzerland (144)
Belgium 276 3 Luxembourg (261) 258 2 Luxembourg (238)
Brazil 214 4 Uruguay (92) 192 4 Uruguay (86)
Bulgaria 34 1 Turkey (34) 17 1 Turkey (17)
Canada 2 1 Ireland (2) 2 1 Ireland (2)
Chile 71 1 Argentina (71) 57 1 Argentina (57)
China 14905 13 Macao (9570) 14224 11 Macao (8788)
Colombia 5 1 Costa Rica (5) 6 1 Costa Rica (6)
Croatia 229 3 Serbia-Mont. (121) 195 3 Serbia-Mont. (93)
Czech Republic 216 2 Slovakia (206) 187 2 Slovakia (177)
Denmark 82 2 Norway (81) 103 1 Norway (103)
Estonia 84 1 Finland (84) 56 1 Finland (56)
France 1398 7 Switzerland (650) 1181 7 Switzerland (469)
Germany 1470 9 Switzerland (658) 1175 9 Switzerland (478)
Greece 94 2 Australia (70) 144 2 Australia (118)
Hong Kong 248 2 Macao (174) 451 3 Macao (363)
Hungary 19 2 Austria (17) 17 2 Austria (13)
India 234 4 Australia (201) 235 4 Australia (197)
Italy 1630 9 Switzerland (1061) 2805 9 Switzerland (1844)
Jordan 184 1 Qatar (184) 145 1 Qatar (145)
Liechtenstein 40 1 Switzerland (40) 28 1 Switzerland (28)
Macao 149 1 Hong Kong (149) 132 1 Hong Kong (132)
Malaysia 67 4 Australia (54) 57 4 Australia (46)
Netherlands 242 5 Belgium (208) 290 5 Belgium (211)
New Zealand 859 1 Australia (859) 859 1 Australia (859)
Panama 11 1 Costa Rica (11) 16 1 Costa Rica (16)
Poland 313 3 Germany (237) 246 3 Germany (196)
Portugal 2824 4 Luxembourg (1906) 2687 5 Luxembourg (1865)
Romania 62 2 Austria (60) 67 3 Austria (53)
Russia 4770 13 Estonia (1391) 4643 13 Estonia (1390)
Serbia-Mont. 2814 9 Switzerland (1637) 2860 9 Switzerland (1649)
Singapore 9 1 Indonesia (9) 10 2 Indonesia (9)
Slovakia 554 2 Czech Republic (549) 657 2 Czech Republic (652)
Slovenia 15 2 Austria (11) 18 2 Austria (11)
South Korea 48 2 Australia (33) 49 2 Australia (36)
Spain 354 5 Switzerland (336) 432 4 Switzerland (412)
Sweden 383 2 Finland (239) 296 2 Finland (182)
Switzerland 114 1 Liechtenstein (114) 97 1 Liechtenstein (97)
Taiwan 27 1 Hong Kong (27) 10 2 Hong Kong (6)
Thailand 14 1 Finland (14) 2 1 Finland (2)
Turkey 2864 8 Denmark (621) 3134 8 Switzerland (632)
UK 3820 5 Australia (2316) 3975 5 Australia (2500)
United States 457 5 Mexico (228) 586 5 Mexico (360)
Uruguay 88 1 Argentina (88) 82 1 Argentina (82)
Vietnam 327 4 Australia (260) 324 3 Australia (251)
Average 906.1 3.4 911.3 3.4
The Table shows summary statistics on second generation immigrants on the mother and father side from
each country of origin in the PISA sample included in our decomposition exercise, across all available waves.
# Host Countries is the number of different host countries in which second generation immigrants of a given
nationality are observed. Top Host Country is the host country where the highest number (reported in
brackets) of second generation immigrants of a given nationality are observed.
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Table 4: Second Generation Immigrants by Host Country - PISA Data
Mothers Fathers
Top Country Top Country
Host # Countries of Origin # Countries of Origin
Country Number of Origin (in PISA) Number of Origin (in PISA)
Argentina 631 6 Uruguay (88) 585 6 Uruguay (82)
Australia 9022 17 UK (2316) 9394 17 UK (2500)
Austria 1979 15 Turkey (487) 1965 15 Turkey (519)
Belgium 3126 7 Turkey (434) 3524 7 Turkey (492)
Costa Rica 460 3 Panama (11) 537 3 Panama (16)
Croatia 2160 4 Serbia-Mont. (363) 1948 4 Serbia-Mont. (348)
Czech Republic 780 6 Slovakia (549) 1014 6 Slovakia (652)
Denmark 2712 6 Turkey (621) 2814 6 Turkey (625)
Estonia 1708 2 Russia (1391) 1839 2 Russia (1390)
Finland 1103 10 Sweden (239) 1266 10 Sweden (182)
Georgia 97 2 Russia (69) 76 2 Russia (51)
Germany 1429 10 Turkey (512) 1515 10 Turkey (559)
Greece 1270 3 Russia (214) 760 3 Albania (173)
Hong Kong 5447 4 China (4758) 5296 4 China (4938)
Indonesia 44 5 Singapore (9) 55 5 Singapore (9)
Ireland 1173 17 UK (946) 1043 15 UK (814)
Israel 2321 5 Russia (606) 2474 5 Russia (596)
Kazakhstan 1174 2 Russia (982) 1117 2 Russia (918)
Kyrgyzstan 480 2 Russia (106) 297 2 Russia (106)
Latvia 2295 4 Russia (967) 2593 4 Russia (1107)
Liechtenstein 330 11 Switzerland (114) 281 11 Switzerland (97)
Luxembourg 4448 10 Portugal (1906) 4540 10 Portugal (1865)
Macao 10202 5 China (9570) 9654 7 China (8788)
Mauritius 84 4 China (11) 57 4 China (8)
Mexico 1085 4 United States (228) 1398 4 United States (360)
Moldova 203 3 Russia (68) 192 4 Russia (59)
Netherlands 1741 16 Turkey (203) 1832 16 Turkey (228)
New Zealand 1989 8 UK (528) 2144 8 UK (620)
Norway 1145 3 Sweden (144) 1149 3 Sweden (114)
Portugal 1576 5 Brazil (61) 1353 5 Brazil (64)
Qatar 5908 4 Jordan (184) 5159 4 Jordan (145)
Serbia-Mont. 2333 4 Croatia (121) 1782 4 Croatia (93)
Slovakia 593 3 Czech Republic (206) 583 3 Czech Republic (177)
Slovenia 1841 3 Italy (8) 1880 3 Italy (10)
South Korea 29 5 China (11) - - -
Switzerland 8453 11 Serbia-Mont. (1637) 8320 11 Italy (1844)
Turkey 229 5 Germany (67) 190 5 Germany (33)
UK 2199 7 China (25) 2380 7 China (26)
Uruguay 313 4 Brazil (92) 338 4 Brazil (86)
Average 2156.7 6.3 2137.1 6.2
The Table shows summary statistics on second generation immigrants on the mother and father side observed
in each country in the PISA sample, across all available waves. Only host countries with second generation
immigrants from at least one country of origin in the PISA sample are included. # Countries of Origin is the
number of different countries of origin of second generation immigrants in a given host country. Top Country
of Origin (in PISA) is the country of origin from which the highest number (across all countries in the PISA
sample, not considering other countries of origin) of second generation immigrants in a given host country are
observed (number reported in brackets).
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Table 5: Main results-PISA
Dependent Variable: Math Test Score
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All No East Asia
Score Country m 0.685*** 0.526*** 0.252*** 0.247*** 0.201*** 0.248***
(0.022) (0.045) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.068)
Female -0.130*** -0.137*** -0.212*** -0.209*** -0.205*** -0.191***
(0.027) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023)
Father Sec Edu 0.032 0.027 0.032
(0.034) (0.034) (0.058)
Father Ter Edu 0.103** 0.096** 0.105*
(0.040) (0.039) (0.058)
Mother Sec Edu 0.009 -0.011 0.019
(0.029) (0.028) (0.047)
Mother Ter Edu 0.036 0.010 0.034
(0.037) (0.037) (0.054)
N 43494 43494 43494 43494 43494 28106
# Country m 49 49 49 49 49 42
R Squared 0.16 0.25 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.63
Host Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent m FE No No No No Yes Yes
The Table shows results for second generation immigrants on the mother’s side. The sample includes only
cases where both parents report a country of origin and the country of origin of the mother runs a PISA test
on natives. Score Country m refers to the average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have mean
0 and standard deviation 1 across the OECD countries participating in 2003) in the country of birth of the
mother, across all available waves. All specifications control for intercept, wave fixed effect and a dummy for
father immigrant status. Observations weighted according to the provided sample weights. Robust standard
errors clustered by mother country of origin. All coefficients and standard errors are estimated according to
the ”Unbiased Shortcut” procedure (PISA Technical Report, 2009), using the replicate weights provided by
PISA. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 6: Summary statistics - US Census (Mothers)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
No Grade Repeated 0.81 0.39 0 1
Score Country m -0.16 0.55 -1.80 1.08
Mother Sec Edu 0.48 0.50 0 1
Mother Ter Edu 0.21 0.40 0 1
Father Sec Edu 0.39 0.49 0 1
Father Ter Edu 0.34 0.47 0 1
Mother Immigrant 1 0 1 1
Father Immigrant 0.46 0.50 0 1
Yrs Since Migr Mother 20.08 8.75 2 57
Female 0.49 0.50 0 1
Student Age 11.35 2.29 8 15
# Obs from Country m 870.18 2117.57 1 13691
Observations 53081
The Table shows descriptive statistics for second generation immigrants on the mother’s side. The sample
includes only cases where both parents report a country of origin and the country of origin of the mother runs
a PISA test on natives. No Grade Repeated is a dummy taking value 1 for students attending a grade larger
or equal to the mode of the corresponding year of birth, quarter of birth, state and year cell. Score Country
m is the average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 across
the OECD countries participating in 2003) in the country of birth of the mother. Observations weighted
accordind to the provided sample weights.
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Table 7: Main results-US CENSUS
Dependent variable: 1=never repeated a grade
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All No East Asia
Score Country m 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.013** 0.019*
(0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.011)
Female 0.068*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.067*** 0.071***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Mother Sec Edu 0.049*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.045***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Mother Ter Edu 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.049***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Father Sec Edu 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.041***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
Father Ter Edu 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.063***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
N 53081 53081 53081 53081 53081 49132
# Country m 61 61 61 61 61 54
R Squared 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11
Comm Zone FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years Since Migr Mother No No No Yes Yes Yes
Continent m FE No No No No Yes No
Score Country m refers to the average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have mean 0 and standard
deviation 1 across the OECD countries participating in 2003) in the country of birth of the mother, across
all available waves. All specifications control for intercept, child age dummies, parents’ age, family size,
log family income, year fixed effect,state fixed effect, (year specific) quarter of birth fixed effect and father
immigrant status. Observations weighted accordind to the provided sample weights. Robust standard errors
clustered by mother country of origin. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, ***
denotes significance at 1%.
Table 8: Selection
Mothers Fathers
Years Edui{Years Edum Years Edui{Years Eduf
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Score Country m -0.125* -0.216**
(0.068) (0.081)
Score Country f -0.107* -0.174***
(0.055) (0.058)
N 45032 45032 44385 44385
R Squared 0.08 0.47 0.09 0.50
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE No Yes No Yes
The sample includes only second generation immigrants on the mother side for specifications (1) and (2)
and on the father side for specifications (3) and (4). Years Edum and Years Eduf are the average years of
education of mothers and fathers in the country of birth of the mother and father respectively. Score Country
m and Score Country f refer to the average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have mean 0 and
standard deviation 1 across the OECD countries participating in 2003) in the country of birth of the mother
and the father, across all available waves. All specifications control for intercept and wave fixed effect. Robust
standard errors clustered by mother’s country of origin in specifications (1) and (2) and by father’s country of
origin in specifications (3) and (4). * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes
significance at 1%.
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Table 9: Selection into Schools
Avg Score School School FE Academic Admission % Qual Teachers Dropout Rate
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Score Country m 0.198** 0.192** 0.049** 0.027** -0.008**
(0.089) (0.084) (0.023) (0.011) (0.004)
Female 0.062*** 0.075*** 0.014 0.007 -0.002
(0.021) (0.020) (0.010) (0.007) (0.002)
Father Sec Edu 0.105*** 0.102*** 0.061** -0.021 -0.007
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.014) (0.009)
Father Ter Edu 0.259*** 0.244*** 0.084*** 0.004 -0.008
(0.041) (0.038) (0.028) (0.016) (0.010)
Mother Sec Edu 0.162*** 0.157*** 0.019 0.010 -0.036
(0.026) (0.025) (0.015) (0.007) (0.028)
Mother Ter Edu 0.255*** 0.240*** 0.025 0.010 -0.037
(0.051) (0.048) (0.024) (0.015) (0.025)
N 42952 42903 43494 32356 10184
# Country m 49 49 49 48 41
R Squared 0.34 0.35 0.17 0.41 0.06
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The sample includes only second generation immigrants on the mother side. Score Country m refers to
the average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 across the
OECD countries participating in 2003) in the country of birth of the mother, across all available waves. All
specifications control for intercept and father immigrant status. Robust standard errors clustered by mother’s




Dependent Variable: Math Test Score
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Score Country m 0.228*** 0.224*** 0.229*** 0.173***
(0.029) (0.034) (0.034) (0.028)
Female -0.206*** -0.208*** -0.206*** -0.171***
(0.025) (0.019) (0.02) (0.02)
Father Sec Edu 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.131***
(0.046) (0.033) (0.033) (0.049)
Father Ter Edu 0.084* 0.080** 0.085** 0.202***
(0.049) (0.039) (0.040) (0.054)
Mother Sec Edu 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.007
(0.035) (0.028) (0.028) (0.044)
Mother Ter Edu 0.062 0.053 0.063* 0.071
(0.049) (0.037) (0.037) (0.046)
Foreign Language at Home -0.094***
(0.031)
Mother Same Native Lang -0.002
(0.034)
Father Same Native Lang -0.036
(0.043)
Mother Linguistic Distance 0.127**
(0.049)
Father Linguistic Distance 0.010
(0.053)
N 40923 40923 40923 21346
# Country m 49 49 49 42
R Squared 0.663 0.664 0.663 0.582
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
The Table shows results for second generation immigrants on the mother’s side. Sample includes only cases
where both parents report a country of origin and the country of origin of the mother runs a PISA test on
natives. Score Country m refers to the average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have mean 0
and standard deviation 1 across the OECD countries participating in 2003) in the country of birth of the
mother, across all available waves. All specifications control for intercept, wave fixed effect and a dummy for
father immigrant stautus. Observations weighted according to the provided sample weights. Robust standard
errors clustered by mother’s country of origin. All coefficients and standard errors are estimated according to
the ”Unbiased Shortcut” procedure (PISA Technical Report, 2009), using the replicate weights provided by
PISA. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 11: Decomposition Results - Cross-Country Variance
VParents (%) VFE (%)
School FE Host Country FE School FE Host Country FE
10.2 29.91 9.59 26.86
(1.90) (3.71) (1.88) (3.75)
The Table shows the share of the cross-country variance accounted by the whole parental component (VParents)
and by the country specific intercept (VFE). Only countries with at least 100 second generation immigrants
in the sample are included in the computation. Standard errors (in parentheses) are computed through a
bootstrap with 200 replications at the student level.
Table 12: Decomposition Results - Countries
Parentsc SParentspc,CHINAq (%) SFEpc,CHINAq (%)
Country PISA Score School FE Country FE School FE Country FE School FE Country FE
China 1.08 1 1 - - - -
Hong Kong 0.63 0.94 0.83 14.17 36.84 7.11 12.09
(19.87) (19.82) (19.85) (19.7)
Switzerland 0.53 0.94 0.51 11.67 89.91 13.50 97.60
(18.73) (26.77) (18.71) (26.78)
Belgium 0.49 0.98 0.52 2.94 81.77 7.26 95.95
(23.02) (34.07) (23.04) (34.16)
Netherlands 0.44 0.92 0.70 12.74 46.55 14.84 53.94
(13.91) (17.90) (13.91) (17.92)
Germany 0.33 0.91 0.58 11.37 56.34 12.08 60.08
(8.25) (11.81) (8.24) (11.82)
New Zealand 0.27 0.66 0.20 42.17 99.54 42.09 99.99
(6.36) (6.96) (6.37) (6.92)
Estonia 0.24 0.96 0.66 4.96 40.57 6.34 45.99
(22.15) (21.63) (22.16) (21.67)
Macao 0.23 0.94 0.64 7.42 43.03 2.59 24.51
(9.69) (11.07) (9.69) (11.03)
France 0.19 0.81 0.33 21.63 75.22 22.49 78.89
(5.75) (8.09) (5.76) (8.09)
Denmark 0.18 1.10 0.7 -10.98 33.85 -8.25 43.08
(17.87) (16.93) (17.89) (16.94)
Australia 0.17 0.59 0.33 45.15 73.97 46.11 77.80
(14.65) (18.97) (14.65) (18.98)
Austria 0.16 0.86 0.25 14.77 81.88 15.3 84.85
(10.44) (14.77) (10.44) (14.79)
Czech Republic 0.13 0.74 0.37 27.24 66.85 25.91 64.05
(10.05) (14.41) (10.07) (14.40)
Vietnam 0.12 0.93 0.52 7.29 50.55 1.76 30.10
(7.25) (7.81) (7.24) (7.77)
Sweden 0.11 0.92 0.52 8.33 49.61 11.44 59.83
(8.24) (9.83) (8.25) (9.85)
United Kingdom 0.09 0.75 0.39 25.33 61.63 26.35 65.67
(3.88) (4.09) (3.89) (4.08)
Poland 0 0.71 0.35 27.26 60.03 25.31 55.2
(5.70) (7.53) (5.70) (7.52)
Slovakia -0.04 0.85 0.23 13.62 68.78 12.30 65.78
(7.98) (9.88) (7.98) (9.90)
Spain -0.09 0.62 0.06 32.94 81.01 31.52 74.90
(5.66) (10.20) (5.66) (10.21)
Continued on next page
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Parentsc SParentspc,CHINAq (%) SFEpc,CHINAq (%)
Country PISA Score School FE Country FE School FE Country FE School FE Country FE
United States -0.09 0.96 0.81 3.10 16.52 4.97 22.99
(5.59) (8.14) (5.59) (8.11)
Portugal -0.19 0.61 0.02 31.17 77.22 27.22 61.09
(3.70) (5.24) (3.70) (5.25)
Italy -0.22 0.49 -0.21 39.38 93.43 38.27 90.35
(4.19) (5.91) (4.19) (5.92)
Russia -0.24 0.84 0.53 12.46 36.10 14.43 42.90
(3.97) (4.25) (3.97) (4.26)
Croatia -0.31 0.57 0.16 31.40 60.36 31.70 62.07
(6.76) (10.07) (6.76) (10.06)
Greece -0.39 0.42 -0.11 39.48 75.52 39.23 74.38
(7.13) (8.55) (7.13) (8.54)
Turkey -0.60 0.37 -0.49 37.36 88.95 33.92 74.45
(2.57) (3.30) (2.57) (3.28)
Serbia-Mont. -0.63 0.51 -0.09 28.97 63.77 29.66 66.46
(2.60) (3.76) (2.60) (3.78)
Romania -0.72 0.63 0.38 20.39 34.18 20.78 35.75
(5.50) (6.66) (5.50) (6.65)
Uruguay -0.74 0.95 0.54 2.60 25.31 1.55 20.46
(8.37) (11.75) (8.38) (11.77)
Chile -0.78 0.70 0.27 15.99 39.36 15.09 36.32
(8.35) (12.58) (8.35) (12.58)
Malaysia -0.84 0.63 0.02 19.09 51.44 18.14 48.49
(9.85) (15.45) (9.85) (15.46)
Argentina -1.07 0.86 0.47 6.70 24.54 6.17 21.54
(6.20) (7.81) (6.19) (7.8)
Albania -1.10 0.43 -0.20 26.35 55.16 25.64 53.05
(2.80) (3.37) (2.79) (3.37)
Jordan -1.16 0.66 0.14 15.36 38.40 15.27 37.77
(3.31) (3.80) (3.31) (3.80)
Brazil -1.19 0.84 0.45 7.19 24.34 5.78 18.46
(5.09) (8.45) (5.09) (8.46)
India -1.46 0.71 0.36 11.36 25.41 9.90 19.59
(2.47) (3.35) (2.47) (3.35)
Average -0.17 0.76 0.33 18.56 56.24 18.16 54.90
(3.32) (4.11) (3.32) (4.13)
The Table shows the decomposition results across countries. Only countries with at least 100 second generation
immigrants in the sample are included. Parentsc is the estimated parental component, normalized such that
ParentsCHINA “ 1. Standard errors (in parentheses) are computed through a bootstrap with 200 replications at
the student level.
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Table 13: Decomposition Results - Regions
Parentsc SParentspc,EAq (%) SFEpc,EAq (%)
Region PISA Score School FE Country FE School FE Country FE School FE Country FE
East Asia 0.90 1 1 - - - -
EU North 0.24 0.88 0.53 18.23 70.69 21.64 83.32
(6.82) (7.87) (6.82) (7.89)
Oceania 0.19 0.63 0.38 52.51 88.07 55.26 98.44
(16.17) (20.79) (16.17) (20.79)
US -0.09 0.99 0.87 1.16 12.71 4.62 24.86
(6.95) (9.88) (6.96) (9.84)
EU South -0.18 0.56 -0.02 40.46 94.46 40.05 92.78
(5.01) (6.39) (5.02) (6.40)
EU East -0.21 0.80 0.50 18.10 45.17 20.15 52.82
(4.65) (4.78) (4.66) (4.77)
Other Asia -0.61 0.80 0.37 13.33 41.78 11.70 35.47
(5.14) (7.27) (5.15) (7.28)
Middle East/NA -0.64 0.42 -0.38 37.82 89.61 35.14 77.85
(3.25) (3.66) (3.26) (3.65)
Latin America -1.14 0.86 0.50 7.01 24.28 6.25 20.49
(5.25) (8.31) (5.25) (8.31)
Average -0.17 0.74 0.34 23.58 58.35 24.35 60.75
(4.37) (5.03) (4.37) (5.03)
The Table shows the decomposition results across regions. The region-specific PISA Scores and Parentsc are
computed as weighted averages across all countries belonging to each region for which at least 100 second
generation immigrants are available in the sample, where the weights are given by the size of the native
population being tested. Parentsc is normalized such that ParentsEA “ 1. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are computed through a bootstrap with 200 replications at the student level.
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Table 14: Interactions - US CENSUS
Dependent variable: 1=never repeated a grade
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Score Country m 0.027*** 0.088*** 0.027*** 0.088*** 0.137*** 0.154***
(0.007) (0.023) (0.007) (0.024) (0.031) (0.035)
Female 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Yrs Schooling Father 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Yrs Schooling Mother 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
Score Country m * Yrs Schooling Mother -0.006***
(0.002)
Yrs Schooling Moth in US 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.002 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Yrs Schooling Moth in m 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Score Country m * Yrs Schooling Moth in US -0.006*** -0.002* -0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Score Country m * Yrs Schooling Moth in m -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Yrs Since Migr Mother 0.002** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Score Country m * Yrs Since Migr Mother -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
Age Migration Moth 0.006***
(0.002)
pAge Migration Mothq2 -0.000***
(0.000)
Score Country m * Age Migration Moth -0.001
(0.001)
N 53081 53081 53081 53081 53081 53081
# Country m 61 61 61 61 61 61
R Squared 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11
Comm Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Score Country m refers to the average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have mean 0 and standard
deviation 1 across the OECD countries participating in 2003) in the country of birth of the mother, across
all available waves. All specifications control for intercept, child age dummies, parents’ age, family size,
log family income, year fixed effect,state fixed effect, (year specific) quarter of birth fixed effect and father
immigrant status. Observations weighted accordind to the provided sample weights. Robust standard errors
clustered by mother’s country of origin. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, ***
denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 15: Interactions - US CENSUS (Mothers Entirely Educated in Home Country)
Dependent variable: 1=never repeated a grade
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Score Country m 0.034*** 0.093*** 0.138*** 0.147***
(0.009) (0.023) (0.034) (0.035)
Female 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.068***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Yrs Schooling Father 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Yrs Schooling Mother 0.005*** 0.003* 0.004** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Score Country m * Yrs Schooling Mother -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Yrs Since Migr Mother 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
Score Country m * Yrs Since Migr Mother -0.003** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
Age Migration Moth 0.005**
(0.002)
pAge Migration Mothq2 -0.000**
(0.000)
Score Country m * Age Migration Moth -0.000
(0.001)
N 29963 29963 29963 29963
# Country m 61 61 61 61
R Squared 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Comm Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
The sample includes only cases where the mother was entirely educated in her home country. Score Country
m refers to the average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1)
in the country of birth of the mother, across all available waves. All specifications control for intercept, child
age dummies, parents’ age, family size, log family income, year fixed effect,state fixed effect, (year specific)
quarter of birth fixed effect and father immigrant status. Observations weighted according to the provided
sample weights. Robust standard errors clustered by mother’s country of origin. * denotes significance at
10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 16: Summary statistics - Time Use Survey (Parents)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total Child Care 86.76 122.3 0 1055
Educational Child Care 9.809 30.29 0 420
Recreational Child Care 21.11 59.76 0 639
Basic Child Care 55.85 90.96 0 1055
Score Country p -0.69 0.59 -1.47 1.08
Yrs Since Migration 15.70 10.63 1 58
Mother 0.48 0.50 0 1
Age Parent 37.72 8.46 18 80
Age Spouse 37.95 8.86 16 80
Parent Sec Edu 0.24 0.43 0 1
Parent Ter Edu 0.38 0.495 0 1
Spouse Sec Edu 0.23 0.42 0 1
Spouse Ter Edu 0.39 0.49 0 1
Number of Children 2.04 0.97 1 7
Avg Age Children 8.13 5 0 18
Number of Male Children 1.04 0.85 0 5
# Obs from Country p 91.21 351.20 2 2624
Observations 5199
The Table shows descriptive statistics for interviewed immigrant parents in the Time Use Survey. Total refers
to the total time spent in child care activities, while Educational, Recreational and Basic refer to the time
use categories as defined in the text. Score Country p is the average math PISA score of natives (standardized
to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1) in the country of birth of the interviewed parent. Observations
weighted according to the provided sample weights.
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Table 17: Time Use of Parents
Total Total Total Educational Recreational Basic
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Score Country p 14.329* 11.938** 8.052** 1.370* 3.249** 3.433
(7.699) (5.005) (3.234) (0.695) (1.372) (2.249)
Mother 67.812*** 7.398*** 3.480 56.933***
(4.030) (0.667) (3.523) (2.493)
Parent Sec Edu -5.355 3.123*** -4.532 -3.946
(5.426) (0.622) (2.870) (2.445)
Parent Ter Edu 10.491** 4.372*** -2.524 8.643***
(5.075) (1.076) (3.223) (2.475)
Spouse Sec Edu 3.159 -2.787*** 7.949*** -2.002
(3.491) (0.519) (2.766) (1.265)
Spouse Ter Edu 12.173*** 0.739 6.868* 4.567**
(2.950) (1.722) (3.571) (2.213)
Age Parent 0.499 0.134** 0.144 0.221
(0.481) (0.063) (0.450) (0.145)
Age Spouse 0.348* 0.194** -0.062 0.216
(0.206) (0.084) (0.262) (0.197)
Number of Children 16.891*** 2.815*** 1.068 13.009***
(2.046) (0.957) (0.865) (1.625)
Avg Age Children -9.140*** -0.354*** -3.387*** -5.399***
(1.315) (0.119) (0.539) (0.774)
Number of Male Children -0.659 1.155*** -2.037** 0.222
(1.741) (0.417) (0.793) (1.203)
Yrs Since Migration -0.020 -0.154*** -0.071 0.205*
(0.162) (0.033) (0.098) (0.122)
N 5199 5199 5199 5199 5199 5199
# Country p 57 57 57 57 57 57
R Squared 0.00 0.03 0.23 0.06 0.10 0.21
State FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The sample includes only immigrant parents of children with at most 18 years. Total refers to the total time
spent in child care activities, while Educational, Recreational and Basic refer to the time use categories
as defined in the text. Score Country p is the average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have
mean 0 and standard deviation 1) in the country of birth of the interviewed parent, across all available
waves. Additional controls in specifications (3) to (6) are dummies for retired, full time students and disabled
parents. Robust standard errors clustered by parent country of origin. * denotes significance at 10%, **
denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 18: Summary statistics - Time Use Survey (Students)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Study Time 57.86 88 0 525
Score Country m -0.65 0.58 -1.47 1.08
Native Father 0.19 0.40 0 1
Female 0.42 0.49 0 1
Mother Sec Edu 0.22 0.41 0 1
Mother Ter Edu 0.38 0.49 0 1
Father Sec Edu 0.19 0.39 0 1
Father Ter Edu 0.38 0.49 0 1
Age 16.39 1.04 15 18
# Obs from Country m 10.56 38.26 1 248
Observations 433
The Table shows descriptive statistics for second generation immigrants on the mother side. Score Country
m is the average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1) in the
country of birth of the mother. Observations weighted according to the provided sample weights.
Table 19: Time Use of Students
Dependent Variable: Study Time
[1] [2] [3]
Score Country m 39.955*** 39.162*** 30.943**
(14.549) (13.584) (12.413)




Mother Sec Edu -7.065
(11.812)
Mother Ter Edu 27.171**
(12.936)
Father Sec Edu 21.818
(15.854)




N 433 433 433
# Country m 41 41 41
R Squared 0.07 0.17 0.20
State FE No Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes
The sample includes only second generation immigrants on the mother side that are full time students and at
most 18 years old. Score Country m is the average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have mean 0
and standard deviation 1) in the country of birth of the mother, across all available waves. Robust standard
errors clustered by mother’s country of origin. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%,
*** denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 20: Country of Origin Characteristics - Economic and Educational Development
Dependent variable: Math Test Score
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Score Country m 0.255*** 0.283*** 0.193*** 0.224*** 0.243*** 0.239***
(0.032) (0.041) (0.065) (0.034) (0.035) (0.038)
Female -0.208*** -0.207*** -0.205*** -0.207*** -0.208*** -0.203***
(0.026) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Father Sec Edu 0.031 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.024
(0.047) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Father Ter Edu 0.108** 0.107*** 0.105*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.098**
(0.051) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039)
Mother Sec Edu -0.003 -0.003 -0.018 -0.008 -0.005 -0.020
(0.036) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Mother Ter Edu 0.028 0.028 0.006 0.020 0.024 0.003
(0.050) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Log GDP -0.060** -0.069**
(0.028) (0.03)
% Skilled Moth in m 0.216*** 0.500***
(0.078) (0.119)
Avg Years Edu in m 0.012 -0.006
(0.009) (0.011)
Pri Pupil/Teacher in m -0.001 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002)
N 42738 42738 42738 42738 42738 42738
# Country m 44 44 44 44 44 44
R Squared 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The sample includes only second generation immigrants on the mother side. Score Country m is the average
math PISA score of natives (standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1) in the country of
birth of the mother, across all available waves. Observations weighted according to the provided sample
weights. Robust standard errors clustered by mother’s country of origin. All coefficients and standard errors
are estimated according to the ”Unbiased Shortcut” procedure (PISA Technical Report, 2009), using the
replicate weights provided by PISA. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes
significance at 1%.
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Table 21: Country of Origin Characteristics - Religion and Culture
Dependent variable: Math Test Score
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Score Country m 0.247*** 0.240*** 0.258*** 0.220***
(0.028) (0.053) (0.035) (0.050)
Female -0.209*** -0.205*** -0.209*** -0.207***
(0.025) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Father Sec Edu 0.032* 0.033 0.033 0.033
(0.046) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Father Ter Edu 0.103** 0.101** 0.104** 0.105***
(0.050) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039)
Mother Sec Edu 0.009 -0.005 0.010 0.004
(0.036) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Mother Ter Edu 0.036 0.016 0.037 0.030
(0.050) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
% Catholic in m -0.142
(0.107)
% Protestant in m 0.002
(0.127)
% Other Christian Rel in m 0.036
(0.296)
% Orthodox in m -0.142
(0.183)
% Jews in m 3.931
(4.031)
% Muslim in m -0.228*
(0.122)
% Hindu in m 0.526***
(0.179)
% Buddhist in m 0.282
(0.213)
% Eastern Religions in m 0.488***
(0.153)
% Other Religion in m -0.146
(0.362)
Leisure Important in Life -0.422***
(0.095)
Child Quality: Hard Work -0.059
(0.117)
Child Quality: Obedience 0.111
(0.231)
Locus of Control 0.091**
(0.038)
N 43494 43494 43294 43294
# Country m 49 49 46 46
R Squared 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
The sample includes only second generation immigrants on the mother side. Score Country m is the average
math PISA score of natives (standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1) in the country of
birth of the mother, across all available waves. Observations weighted according to the provided sample
weights. Robust standard errors clustered by mother’s country of origin. All coefficients and standard errors
are estimated according to the ”Unbiased Shortcut” procedure (PISA Technical Report, 2009), using the
replicate weights provided by PISA. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes
significance at 1%.
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